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States of sovereignty, sovereign states, and
ethnic claims for international status
O L I V E R  P. R I C H M O N D 1
Abstract. Sovereignty is heavily contested by existing states which view the survival of
territorial sovereignty as vital to international order and many ethnic groups that see states as
an obstacle to their own claims to sovereignty. This article looks at how and why ethnic claims
to sovereignty arise. It examines when such claims may emerge, what forms such claims may
take, the benefits ethnic groups perceive may accrue, and the implications for the international
system and the emerging post-Westphalian international society.
‘Sovereign, law, and prohibition formed a system of representation of power which was
extended during the subsequent era by the theories of right: political theory has never ceased
to be obsessed with the person of the Sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy
themselves with the problem of sovereignty. What we need… is a political philosophy that
isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law
and prohibition. We need to cut off the king’s head: in political theory that has still to be
done.’2
‘The paradigm of sovereignty operates on the basis of a simple dichotomy: sovereignty versus
anarchy.’3
Introduction
Sovereignty has become inextricably associated with debates about power, territory
and international status, and has been generally acknowledged to provide internal
security in a Westphalian order which combats anarchy: yet in the case of ethnic
groups’ attempts to gain status and security this linkage is fundamentally flawed.
‘Ethnic sovereignty’ occurs when ethnic groups claim sovereignty and try to act as if
they were sovereign at the military, political, social, and institutional levels. It is a
form of quasi sovereignty constituting, perhaps, more than a degree of statehood.4
Often the only resources such groups are denied are international relations, external
legitimacy, and regional economic integration. Ethnic claims for sovereignty, often
expressed through separatist violence, arise to prevent insecurity through irredentist
or secessionist movements, inspired by grass roots movements, internal ethnic
entrepreneurs, or by outside actors. Out of about seventy-five conclusive or incon-
clusive separatist conflicts since 1945, about fifteen have resulted in an apparent
military victory for the state (including the recent case of Chechnya) and a further
four are being contested; several have resulted in independence for the group
(Bangladesh, Eritrea, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, and possibly Slovakia and the
Czech Republic); seven have been the recent subject of a devolutionary process
(including Northern Ireland); six have been frozen and unresolved (including
Cyprus); two have led to possible future statehood (Kosovo and East Timor); four
have led to peace accords of a questionable nature; seven have resulted in peace
accords and accommodation; a further ten have led to an accommodation contested
by various factions; and at least thirteen are subject to ongoing violence (including
the Kurds, in Kashmir, in Irian Jaya, the Tamils, in Southern Sudan, and the
Punjab). At least forty-five states have been threatened with division, possibly several
times, or have divided during this period.5
The exercise of ethnic sovereignty may lead to unsustainable non-pluralist entities
whose internal legitimacy is probably far greater than their external legitimacy (as
in the case of the TRNC).6 Ethnic groups may find themselves supporting authori-
tarian leaders who exploit forms of violence and who may not represent democratic
ideals of civil society, as has been the case with Yasser Arafat, the leader of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation, and with various Kurdish, Chechen, Tamil and
Kosovan militants. The entities emerging from these struggles, by virtue of their
mono-ethnic nature, are likely to become engaged in violent conflicts with the
recognized states in which they are located, and, if they receive independence or
autonomy, may find it far more difficult to enter into reciprocal arrangements with
other actors in order to join interdependent economic and security groups. Yet
they come into existence because national sovereignty produces exclusion for non-
homogenous identity groups through its concentration on the predominance of
international security, its weakness in overseeing civil society (via a reliance on
democratic structures that can create minorities within political minorities), and
through the inherent structure of non-intervention which arises at the interstate
level. This latter often fails to prevent such pressures on ethnic groups from arising,
such that they, their neighbours, or their leadership, turn to violence in response (as
recently seen in Kosovo) in the search for human rather than state security. Yet,
paradoxically, human security is perceived to be provided by ethnic groups through
state security in the international system. This has, since the end of the Cold War,
raised the issue of humanitarian intervention; in turn, this has brought the practice
of both peacekeeping and peacemaking beyond the limits that the norm of non-
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intervention normally prescribed. Because this has generally occurred in the context
of ethnic conflict, a normative discourse has re-emerged focusing on humanitaria-
nism, culture and identity, and motivated by a need to regain ‘order’ and protect the
status quo on the part of the dominant actors of the international system. Thus,
ethnic claims to sovereignty have raised the issue of the identity of the international
system and the question of on what normative, cultural, and political basis the inter-
national community can respond to such claims. There are three levels to explore
here: the first relates to how states view ethnic sovereignty; the second relates to how
ethnic groups view state sovereignty; and the third relates to how to the international
community responds to such claims.
The following article elaborates on these points in an effort to uncover both the
implications of universalizing sovereignty debates for ethnic actors and how the inter-
national system itself may provoke ethnic sovereignty. It addresses how and why
ethnic sovereignty arises, and with what results. The construction of the notion of
ethnic sovereignty is derived both from strategic considerations and the normative
turn that has emerged relating to considerations of justice and security which
permeate the international system, and which are increasingly problematic.7 Para-
doxically, this turn, when applied by identity groups, threatens to reproduce the
flawed Westphalian treatment of identity—something that the bulk of the literature
on ethnic conflict seems to have ignored.
Conflict and concurrence within international society
The international system in the post Cold-War environment is rapidly evolving,
incorporating interactions and transactions between many different actors, and
involving different debates relating to power, sovereignty, intervention, norms, and
resources of both a concrete and abstract level. There are three levels that can be
identified and characterized in a general way from the point of view of the ethnic
actor.8 The first relates to the societal level and can be referred to as civil co-
operative society made up of ethnic or multi-ethnic groups. The second refers to the
level of the traditional interstate system in which inflexible norms of sovereignty
exist relating to nation-states, and the third relates to the contradictory tensions
caused by the parallel forces of regionalization, globalization, and identity (producing
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integration and fragmentation) that operate at a level where sovereignty is viewed as
both reciprocal and inflexible, yet weakening. At this level, the much contested
concepts of global civil9 and international society provide a framework for the
humanitarian claims of actors engaged in a struggle for identity and territory.
Civil society is perceived to be based on a normative tradition of enlightened self-
interest, justice, humanitarianism, and independence, while the second level, the
interstate system, is based on a tradition of power-politics, competition and conflict
in an environment made up of legally constituted sovereign states, which however,
provide security, status and legitimacy to their dominant groups. At the third level,
international society provides the philosophical framework for human security,
despite the fact that it is torn by the tensions produced by statecentric interests,
globalization and integration, and by the ‘onerous’ burden of humanitarianism.10
These three levels can be characterized in terms of the old distinction between a
normative order and the order of power-politics. The order of power-politics
became a system through the Westphalian imaginary in which sovereignty, territoria-
lity and secularism became corner-stones of the international political structure and
hence the international system of reciprocal recognition, enshrined in international
law and in every peace treaty since Westphalia. Yet, with the elevation of intrinsic
individual and human rights since the Enlightenment (though problematic in its
universalism) and more particularly since the end of the Cold War, the international
system of nation or national states11 has increasingly come into conflict with this
notion—into conflict with itself. The first impulse of the analyst was to place
Realpolitik above such rights in IR12 but the late twentieth century saw a shift from
this position particularly as global and regional pressures have begun to push states
into mutual co-operation.13 Even Carr recognized this in his famous attack on
idealism.14 This can only continue, given the growing pressures on resources and on
the environment, and the relative inability of states to impose themselves unilaterally
in the contemporary world. This has led to debates about humanitarian intervention
and the complexities over doing nothing, imposing universal values to end conflicts,
and the sustainability of doing either.
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If we examine this three-level analysis15 then we can see that international and
civil society levels are wrapped up in similar human security projects. Yet they may
produce ethno-political tensions if these debates lead to, or prevent, fragmentation
as a result of the attempted imposition of norms and values this entails, so eventually
creating mono-ethnic rather than multiethnic states. Furthermore, the international
system of sovereign states, though dominant because of its control of massive
resources and legal access to the means of violence, appears to be increasingly
anomalous because it depends on units with homogenous national identities in a
territorially fixed and unchanging ‘jig-saw puzzle’ model. The state system, sand-
wiched in between the civil and the global, may exacerbate ethnic tensions via
parochial elites’ struggles for power and status in an environment in which identity
has become more important than welfare, prosperity and co-existence, because of
the notions of security that the international system entails. It is these notions of
security that are perhaps more problematic than the direct challenges to majorities
and sovereign actors which ethnic groups may mount. The institution of sovereignty
is under question from those caught up in it yet not recognized by it. Hence the
notion of ethnic sovereignty constitutes their attempt to find legitimacy, status, and
security in the international system that will entail internal and external legitimacy.
It is an extension of personal sovereignty, mirroring the sovereignty of units that call
themselves states, and by similar criteria, but appealing to normative positions to
provide ethnic sovereign actors with status and security.16 It is important to note that
the logic of the Westphalian international system would seem to require that identity
groups can find security through becoming sovereign in a national sense, and
reproducing the logic of the nation state in an anarchic system. Devious objectives,17
the exploitation of negotiation, mediation, and other forms of diplomacy for objec-
tives unrelated to the notion of compromise and concession, often arise as an
unspoken compromise for ethnic groups between sovereignty and violence. If their
claims do not receive recognition they may struggle interminably at bureaucratic,
political, and practical levels in the hope that it accrues, as has occurred in the case
of the (now) Palestinian Authority, and the unrecognized Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus. If the ethnic group feels that no progress is being made they may
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exploit forms of violence (organized or random, often aimed at civilian as well as
military targets), as in the case of the Palestinians, the Kurds, in Kashmir, with the
East Timorese or the Chechens, often of a high profile (dichotomous terrorist/
freedom fighter) nature.
While sovereignty has passed from Sovereign to recognized state-government in
order to represent the interests of numerical majorities within many states, the focus
of the struggle for diplomatic representation and identity has shifted to actors that
find themselves excluded from contemporary Westphalian norms of sovereignty and
national democratic governance. ‘Cutting off the king’s head’ implies a more egali-
tarian distribution of the political resources of sovereignty at the inter-subjective
level, and a rethinking of claims to sovereignty, bringing groups which were formerly
disregarded, marginalized, or de-emphasized, into the emerging global system of
political representation, resource distribution and development, and global meaning.
Understanding the location of individuals in the context of the Westphalian inter-
national system requires a recognition that traditional forms of sovereignty locate
individuals in a nation/national-state, which exists in a somewhat anarchical order;
yet most of the world’s population is now located in multi-ethnic states that are
members of regional and global organizations, and all actors are susceptible to
transnational norms and regimes, of a political, social, economic, ethical (or coercive
nature). In many of these states the relationship between ethnic groups and territory
is fraught by conflicting claims, between normative, historical, and strategic interpre-
tations of territorial possession and rights of autonomy. Identity claims have gained
new legitimacy; hence the emergence of ethnic sovereignty. Increasingly it is possible
to discuss the acquisition of state sovereignty by certain groups such as the Kosovo
Albanians and by the Palestinians, though not with the Kurds or the Chechens18
such inconsistencies may only increase the attempted replication of exclusionary
forms of statehood by ethnic groups.
The view from the international system
It is like chaos theory…19
The UN Charter codified the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention that had
emerged from the Westphalia system; this constitutes an important, though increas-
ingly contested, part of the contemporary state system—together with the notion of
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the ‘Westphalian imaginary’.20 Since the Treaty of Westphalia in particular, the
international system has been based on a legal model prescribing the sovereign
equality of states in order to inject a level of ‘society’ into it. In line with critical and
normative debates, the balance between enclosure and responsibility is increasingly
in conflict in terms of human security rather than state security, the possibility of
the irreversible collapse of the legitimacy of states and their ability to distribute
welfare and security. At the same time, the legitimacy of other actors vis-à-vis states,
and their ability to gain a reasonable level of welfare and security, has come to the
fore. This has entailed a rethinking process that has provided an opportunity for
ethnic claims for sovereignty to become creditable.
The Westphalian state has provided the somewhat tautological conceptual and
epistemological conditions for sovereignty and recognition at the level of the tradi-
tional interstate system.21 As Held has argued, the development of the state system
has seen an impetus towards the coincidence of territorial boundaries with a govern-
ance system; the introduction of standing armies; the creation of new mechanisms
of law-making and enforcement; the centralization of administrative power; the
alteration and extension of fiscal management; and the formalization of diplomacy
and diplomatic institutions.22 Sovereignty offered a method of deciding the legiti-
macy of claims to power,23 and dictated that states are the highest form of political
community and authority responsible for law-making, enforcement and settlement
of disputes in the context of international law, which itself is oriented towards the
creation of the minimum rules of coexistence. Though all states are equal before the
law, conflicts between states are ultimately settled by force, and consequently the
collective priority is the minimization of impediments to state action.24
Many ethnic actors, either leadership or grassroots actors, have mobilized according
to these provisions with the hope of acquiring international status, as in the cases
of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Chechens, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians in Nagorno
Kharabakh, Palestinians and Kurds which all established secessionist movements
based upon the replication of nation-statehood. Consequently, states assume their
claims to sovereignty are sacrosanct, seek to protect and promote their unity and
cohesion, while ethnic groups seek to reproduce the logic of the national state to
gain security, welfare, and legitimacy. This has tended to lead to an emphasis on
security stemming from the attainment and creation of mono-ethnic units and
provides ethnic actors with a powerful incentive to claim sovereignty, as statehood is
perceived as the most advanced framework though which interests and needs can be
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pursued. It also provides state actors with a powerful incentive not to share power
internally with ethnic actors which may in the future decide to secede, as this would
risk a compromise of the state’s (and its dominant interest groups’) abilities to act.
This tension was brought about because while the Treaty of Westphalia codified the
principles and strategies of the secular state system,25 the Paris Peace conference
after World War I established a contradictory doctrine of self-determination. This
was only partially defused by the League’s reconfirmation of the principle of
territorial integrity in Article 10 of its Covenant, which gave priority to historically
established state boundaries over the secessionist demands of minorities.26
Subsequently, during the Cold War era sovereignty and non-intervention was
paramount. In the post-Cold War era a slight shift of emphasis towards human
forms of security carries broad implications and repercussions. What has evolved is
a set of clearly contradictory positions for states that contain more than one identity
group making territorial claims beyond individual, democratic and minority rights.
This has been partly responsible for ethnic conflict. Levels of security and legitimacy
within pre-existing states have not been enough to prevent ethnic violence emerging
nor tame internal ethnic ‘security dilemmas’, or prevent ethnic groups and minorities
from perceiving their relationship with majorities and states as being inherently zero-
sum. Though sovereignty has increasingly been viewed as flawed for these reasons,27
ethnic groups tend to desire sovereignty despite potentially impinging on an existing
state’s claim to sovereignty in the process. This is the ‘sovereignty trap’; the fear of
disorder lurking beyond the statecentric order has meant that most actors, ethnic or
national, have walked knowingly or unknowingly straight into this trap. Thus, for
ethnic groups sovereignty is both their enemy, their saviour-liberator, and dictator.
This has led to a situation where states either assimilate, dominate, or promote an
ideology of multiculturalism vis-à-vis minorities, and in return ethnic groups and
minorities can accept assimilation, try to gain autonomy, or merely vocalize their
difficulties.28 If multi-culturalism or assimilation fail, ethnic groups may decide on
claiming sovereignty. Actors which control international recognition usually counter
secessionist movements with all of the instruments of repression at their disposal,
as exemplified by the responses of the Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi governments to
the episodic rebellions by the Kurds, and there is no framework through which the
UN or other actors can counter ethnic claims to sovereignty, other than through
minority rights regimes, or humanitarian intervention.29 Organizations like the OSCE,
have found similar difficulties when it comes to broadening international frameworks
to include the interests and the rights of non-state actors.30 Despite this, humani-
tarian intervention has increasingly been on the agenda, as the cases of Somalia,
Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated in the 1990s (and Rwanda emphatically underlined).
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The tension between the international system and identity is therefore a core
failing of the Westphalian international system and its attempts to promote ‘order’.
While some have argued that Article 1 of the UN Charter contained a promise of
self-determination, Kelsen argued that it described relations among states, and that
self-determination of peoples actually means the sovereignty of states: the principle
of self-determination is thus basically a principle of non-intervention and respect
for the claim of sovereign equality of UN member states.31 For example, the inter-
national community’s ability to address the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia from 1991–
1995 was stymied by the inherent contradiction between the right of national self
determination claimed by ethnic minorities and national groups to legitimate their
statehood, and the principle of territorial integrity.32 Here, the international com-
munity could have affirmed the moral and political superiority of human rights and
democracy over territorial integrity and national self-determination. This would
have required, as Burg has argued, that norms of human rights should therefore take
priority over ethnic self-determination and that the principle of territorial integrity
be subordinated to advancing democracy.33 While this appears to be plausible, the
main problem would be to overcome the view of ethnic groups that sovereignty is
the only final guarantee of their security. Furthermore, in the Westphalian frame-
work, human rights are mainly the responsibility of states and their transnational
organizations and institutions; democracy provides a safeguard of sorts, though
ethnic minorities are far weaker than political minorities. Outside intervention in
ethnic conflict, therefore, is fraught with difficulty as it is linked to changes in formal
concepts of, and claims to, sovereignty associated with the traditional international
system, to which even the increasing implementation of ‘human rights enforce-
ment’34 in the early to mid 1990s seemed to have fallen victim. Such forms of inter-
vention are equally problematic as they tend to assume that sovereignty remains a
potential barrier, and that its re-establishment or support is its goal—as was seen in
Somalia from 1993–95. The justification of such intervention is also a normative
problem for identity groups as it may threaten to replace physical insecurity with
cultural and socioeconomic insecurity as was in evidence in the massive UN involve-
ment in Cambodia to implement the terms of the Paris Peace Accords between 1991
and 1993.
The traditional international system is based on rigid segregation and the compart-
mentalization of territory (as well as the division of economic resources). Identity,
culture, history and tradition are valued only if they strengthen national debates and
provide a pool of loyal labour for defensive, military and economic purposes. It is
this apparent undervaluing of local identities which provides the first major anomaly
in the context of the emerging traditions of civil, regional and global norms. The
second major anomaly is methodological in that the division of territory into self-
sufficient or at least self-enforcing state projects tends to promote the division of
populations into local identity groups, which given their differing access to
resources, may suffer from historical, natural, or other forms of inequality. Thus, it
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is the international system which is an ‘orrery of errors’35 as the logic it provides
actors cannot be successfully applied to all groups of actors, and only succeeds in
creating the best-case of stability in a self-help system if certain specialized con-
ditions are also met. It is these conditions that the traditional system has identified
as being constants, which are actually in flux. The point here is that traditional
notions of sovereignty provide states with security dilemmas, but the same logic can
also be applied to identity groups within states or of a transborder nature. In effect,
the ethnic security dilemma stems from the view that majorities may oppress
minorities, which can therefore only find safety in ethno-politics and ethno-political
alliances.36 The dilemma is that to separate may lead to violence, but not to separate
may continue institutionalized oppression and structural violence. The extension of
the ethnic security dilemma leads to the domino-effect proposition, or Balkanization,
which all existing states fear.37
This is nowhere more apparent that in the areas which the collapse of the former
Soviet Union left in transition, where the politics of identity became the main
approach to political reorganization on a massive scale. These areas, often over-
looked, exemplify much that remains problematic about the traditional view of the
international system.38 This is also indicative of the failure of the traditional inter-
national system to deal with large scale change in the Middle East, the Mediterranean,
Eastern Europe, and many post-colonial states, and the elevation of the expression
of ethnic identity as a basic human right in response to the inability of states to
provide or guarantee security and justice to such groups. Thus, the response of
ethnic sovereignty on the part of oppressed ethnic groups that fear oppression.
Even in the so-called ‘zones of peace’39 the traditional international system is
under pressure from regional interdependence and humanitarian norms purportedly
of a global nature, as well as local pressure for greater regional accessibility and
accountability. This may be described as the emergence of a post-conventional
awareness in which a universal basis for the existence of political community may
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be attained.40 In ‘zones of instability’, by implication, a conventional awareness
dominates, which has led to a dependence on the rationale of the state-system to
overcome and to counteract the security dilemmas of which states and ethnic groups
are the victim. The problem here is that the rationale of the state system operates at
a level which does not reflect the full panoply of interactions and levels which have
the potential and impetus to destabilize in the name of ethnic claims. Many states
fall in between these zones. Cyprus is an example where the pressure for a post-
modern state41 in a regionalized environment has come into conflict with the
pressures which traditional state behaviour and concerns replicate. Cyprus will be an
important test case to see whether a post-conventional awareness will overcome the
traditional, or whether the logic of the international system is still inscrutably of an
exclusionary nature. Kosovo is also important in that the international community
agreed that the integrity of Serbia is less important that the rights of the Albanians
as an identity group.42 This has already occurred on the part of the British govern-
ment vis-à-vis Northern Ireland, with an elaborate constitutional arrangement in
which conflicting identities are somewhat assuaged by a flexible approach to sover-
eignty and governance (though as with all written agreements, the devil has proved
to reside in the implementation).43 The turn of events in Kosovo, with the attain-
ment of de facto status, and legitimacy as a negotiating partner for the Kosovo
Albanians, indicated a level of organization, coherent objectives, directed by a
unified and concerted community with a common objective; this placed pressure on
the Serbs to accede to their demands which necessitated the exercising of their own
sovereignty in order to protect it or make concessions. However, in the case of the
Kurds, the lack of a co-ordinated civil society project, and the use of widespread
terror tactics, led the international community into regarding their claim for an
independent state of Kurdistan with suspicion; the no-fly zone44 in northern Iraq
seemed to indicate that the international community is committed to human security
for the Kurds in the region, but not to separate sovereignty; in Turkey, the inter-
national community has done little more than call on Turkey to respect human
rights, regarding the Kurdish issue in south-east Turkey as a purely internal issue
though some pressure for reform has been exerted through the EU. In the case of
the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus, ethnic claims to sovereignty has been
taken several steps further, and like the Palestinian authority, with the aid of
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external sponsors or influence, they have established an autonomous entity which
only lacks official recognition from the outside, mainly because its status is disputed
or rejected by another state (the Republic of Cyprus in the case of the Turkish
Cypriots, and Israel in the case of the Palestinians45).46 Similarly the break-up of the
former Yugoslavia, and the Chechen war, has resulted in the establishment of actors
with various claims to sovereignty. The long-running conflict over Kashmir between
India and Pakistan tends to obscure the fact that there are indigenous groups within
the territory that are making their own claims for sovereignty. The presence of
Indian-backed communities in both Sri Lanka and Fiji (partly because of former
British colonial policy) led to continual counter-claims for sovereignty which
continue today despite the fact that regional dynamics may have changed. Such
irredentist and secessionist movements aim for the recreation of sovereign units with
homogenous identities plus viable territorial, political, and resource structures. In
this world of scarcity, this seems to be a doomed movement leading down the trail
of historical conflict and enmity over resources, identity, and even race, replicated by
the sovereign discourse between states and ethnic groups. Such conflict easily
becomes characterized by the appropriation of primeval myths of difference.
This means that the international system needs to find a way of mediating state
claims to sovereignty with identity and human security. Most attempts to do exactly
this have, however, almost inevitably handed authority for the implementation of
such approaches to states, which are identified as responsible for protecting those
rights.47 Consequently, the international system itself serves to exacerbate the per-
ceptions of ethnic groups as to the inequalities of their situation within the state
system, particularly when it comes either to a struggle on their part against oppres-
sion (often from a state), or on the part of ethnic entrepreneurs who also tend to
reject the existing system.
Numerous UN resolutions related to the challenge of identity reveal the inherent
dilemma in managing ethnic conflict and the tensions which exist between group
rights and the perceived need for a stable international system. The Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples states that all peoples
have the right to self-determination, and calls for all armed action or repressive
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples to cease in order to enable
them to exercise peacefully and fully their right to complete independence. Yet it also
makes clear that any attempt at the partial or total disruption of state sovereignty is
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.48 Inherent in this
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framework is an inability of the international community (as opposed to the inter-
national system) to accommodate conflicting claims for sovereignty over the same
shared territorial space. Sovereignty’s linkage with territory in a neatly compart-
mentalized system breaks down where sovereignty is linked with ethnic identity.49
It is the tension over whether ethnic actors will willingly allow states to assume
the final responsibility for their status and rights that leads to ethnic claims for
sovereignty, which becomes an extension of personal sovereignty, and in the absence
of an umbrella organization in which personal and civil rights coincide, ethnic groups
tend to create their own institutional framework. This can be seen as a reaction
against the legal and political fragility of being assigned minority status, and a
normative force for recognition of status and legitimacy. Thus, from the point of
view of the international system, ethnic sovereignty is an anomaly caused by its own
sovereign claims; from the point of view of states, it is a fundamental threat to their
integrity and survival, and also to their claim to a sovereign monopoly on legitimacy.
Ethnic groups and claims for sovereignty
The expression of self-determination is derived from the principal of democratic
equality and has been a somewhat vague notion incorporated into the international
system since the League of Nations (although it was not specifically mentioned
in the Covenant).50 The UN Charter does make specific reference51 to self-deter-
mination, though the principle was to be applied to non-self-governing territories.
Since the process of decolonization gathered speed the principle has been stretched
into new areas, as indicated by the gradual increase of legitimacy accrued by the
Palestinians, for example. This has legitimized, at least in the eyes of ethnic groups,
its progressive interpretation via a normative interpretation of the underpinnings of
international community and a strategic vision of the workings of the international
system.52
‘Location’ and ‘sovereignty’ constitute the key to ethnic survival; freedom from
interference in a defensible territory is seen as vital to ensuring the survival of
distinct communities. Consequently, what matters to an ethnie is the possession or
association with a physical ‘homeland’.53 The crucial forces creating and recreating
ethnic identity are the geopolitical location of the community, religion, degree of
autonomy, and degree of hostility it encounters,54 and the group may reinforce its
internal legitimacy through grass roots or entrepreneur-led ethno-nationalism. The
structure and concepts of the international system are utilized by ethnic actors to
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reconstruct their status in diplomatic language—therefore acceptable to states—that
endeavours to provide the resources of statehood. Sovereignty itself becomes
‘imagined’, associated with identity from which rights are then derived,55 leading to
a movement for self-determination. Thus, sovereignty becomes a package which
ethnic groups exploit in the context of the ‘Westphalian imaginary’. Ethnic actors
are agents, though the claims of, and to, sovereignty come to redefine them—this
may often provide the spark which intensifies ethnic awareness into conflict at the
civil level.56 Sovereignty is supposed to represent the unity of identity, security, terri-
tory and power. Yet the incorporation of human rather than state security means
ethnic groups may import ‘international’ concepts to a shared/ ambiguous political
space from their imagined traditional international system, so leading to ethnic
sovereignty.
Such groups seek self-determination for several reasons:
The urge for self-government may be motivated by a reaction against self-discrimination and
humiliation, by the pragmatic expectation that the new nation-state will have greater
economic and political freedom, by the wish to have a state in which different public policies
would be pursued, by the desire for power and prestige amongst nationalist elites, or to
protect a given ethnic culture from extinction … Most importantly enthusiasm for the
principle of self-determination flows from the democratisation of the world.57
Ethnic groups view sovereignty as providing their best prospects, yet have their
own perceptions and version of what it entails. The general logic is that in the
contemporary international system, all sovereign actors are perceived to have greater
levels of security than non-sovereign actors, despite the examples provided by the
states of Pakistan, Cyprus, Israel, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka and many others, in which
sovereignty was not a guarantee of external security or internal commitment. The
sovereign assertion that territorial inviolability is paramount promotes territorial
[ethno] nationalism.58
Conversely, ethnic groups tend to perceive sovereignty in its inflexible legalistic
form, despite the fact that their actions may transgress this. In the contemporary
environment, ethnic communities and their representatives must be able to prove
that they have been discriminated against, perhaps violently by the majority, must
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also be able to show that they have a coherent identity, territorial consistency and
that there is very little choice other than sovereignty if they are to become secure
and gain a level of equality with other actors in the local environment. Given that
this will tend to be the perspective of ethnic groups that are either oppressed, or are
being prompted by allies or sponsors in the local or regional environment, there is
an opportunity for ethnic actors both to appeal to and exploit the principles which
lie behind the notion of self-determination for their own zero-sum objectives. This
blueprint of conditions required to create a viable claim for sovereignty and ethnic
mobilization means that the ethnic group must have a coherent, monolithic voice in
order to project plausible policies for separatism. It is at this point that ethnic entre-
preneurs can step in to exploit the potential that autonomy provides for the
community driven by ethnic perceptions of sovereignty and self-determination, as
occurred in the Turkish Cypriot community of Cyprus after intercommunal fighting
occurred in 1963. Identity politics thus becomes the prime area of discourse in an
ethno-nationalist dialogue.
From this ethnic sovereignty emerges, based on normative and strategic percep-
tions of status. Claimants may accept the fact that international recognition is
initially limited to mere procedural interaction with other members of the interna-
tional community, as has been the case since the unilateral declaration of independ-
ence of the TRNC in 1983. But, many ethnic groups hold the hope that in future
their status will be elevated, much in the same way that many colonial subjects after
World War II believed that decolonization would result in unfettered sovereignty.
From the perspective of ethnic groups ethnic sovereignty is seen as a precursor to a
final legitimization and confirmation of their internal and external status, as has
been the case with the Palestinian authority and their stated intention (first muted in
1988) to declare full sovereignty.59 It is a process of self-actualization in the context
of the sovereign discourse of the contemporary international system. It is also
possible that if this self-actualization does not receive external recognition, elements
of the group may be tempted to use forms of low intensity violence such as
terrorism in order to bring attention to their situation and apply pressure for change.
Yet, this means that sovereignty has become more stylized than practical.60
Because it was never envisaged that ethnic groups would become able to challenge
states and their assimilationist nature, there was not perceived the need to incor-
porate other actors into the framework of the international system as the framework
of governance of each state was able to do this to varying degrees, particularly if
they were/are democracies. There is still the tendency amongst state actors to avoid
giving power to non-state actors although this has seen an incremental erosion since
the end of the Cold War. In Sri Lanka, Albania, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Spain,
for example, minority provisions and enhanced status may still not go far enough
for more radical subgroups. Groups, such as the Kurds, still have to deal with
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traditional assimilationist states that perceive them to be Trojan horses undermining
national security in unstable regions where security is already fragile.
The focus of ethno-politics, as an increasing important vertical and horizontal
segment of international politics, is on status and identity, leading to debates about
secession, autonomy, or new political systems, and notions of legitimacy and equality
are new key conditions.61 Sovereignty provides one of the most significant concep-
tual obstacles in that disputants see sovereignty as indivisible, according to the con-
ventional Westphalia idea,62 but are forced to use violence to divide states and then
recreate a mono-ethnic state of their own. Thus, in conditions where ethnic groups
perceive their rights and existence are under threat they begin to organize resistance
at social, political, and military levels, and as soon as they are able to influence (not
necessarily dictate) the stability and order of a given state, they begin to accrue levels
of ethnic sovereignty. Such developments are also driven by their own perceptions of
the international system and the way in which actors are legally enabled to organize
in order to gain security, legitimacy, and prosperity. Often they work within the grey
areas of the international system to gain their objectives; often they may well exploit
that system in order to accrue levels of sovereignty by exaggerating the threat they
face and even manufacturing evidence.63 Ethnic sovereignty therefore is constituted
by levels of political organization within an ethnic group, against existing states,
with the objective of autonomy, secession, and separate statehood.64 It is often
symbolized for the ethnic group by negotiations with the opposition, particularly if
an international mediator (from the UN or another state) is involved; often there-
fore, ‘ethnic negotiations’ often degenerate into arguments over status or indirect
political manoeuvres in order to attain/ confirm legitimacy.65 The contemporary
trend amongst the international community of taking a humanitarian or normative
view of identity conflict enables ethnic groups to simulate sovereignty. Often, of
course, such systems are built on militarization, powerful and possibly irredentist
sponsorship, isolation, poverty and an uncertain future, but such groups may still
value their ethnic sovereignty more than entering the international community on
the terms of accepting limited autonomy or minority status.66
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The view from beyond the Westphalian system
Are claims for ethnic sovereignty inevitable? The forces of regionalization and
globalization accentuate the fragmentation brought about by ethnic groups’ claims,
prompting efforts to preserve their historical, cultural and other traditions. Yet it is
also within the international community67 that a normative framework exists that
offers ethnic groups both the hope of a broader, human, ethnic and cultural security,
and a general recognition of the existence of a normative basis for such claims.
Thus, a post-Westphalian international society, oriented around norms of human
security and open discourses, may provide both the framework for the recognition
of ethnic claims and the framework by which these claims emerge as viable—in
the discourse of self-determination, human rights, basic freedoms and political
equality.68 However, in the current rationalist international discourse ethnic groups
may translate this dual recognition into claims for sovereignty, thus extending
the international community into a position where its normative basis may under-
mine the basic foundations of the Westphalian international system—sovereignty
and non-intervention. Potentially, ascribing sovereignty through recognition (as
occurred during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia) could have become the UN’s,
ROs’ or states’ tool for providing human security to ethnic groups.69 Because of the
fear of balkanization, it has led to the practice of peacemaking and peacekeeping in
such cases becoming increasingly interventionary. Rationally speaking, the former
would lead to a proliferation of both ethnic claims and states, while the latter has led
to humanitarian intervention and its normative claims which makes international
‘order’ even more uncertain, selective, and contested.
Notwithstanding, this would seem to necessitate both a more flexible view of state
claims to sovereignty and decisive measures to respond to the claims of ethnic
groups before they become charged with the Westphalian discourses of national self-
determination and state sovereignty. The shift to a more flexible view of sovereignty,
which in itself may defuse the Pandora’s box of ethnic conflict, may occur through
the development of civil society in the context of regional and global norms of
interdependence, democratization, human rights and welfare. Perhaps this would
be along the lines of the dialogic community in a post-Westphalian international
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society, recently elucidated by Linklater.70 This proposes both a universal basis for
such a community, which would present a firm foundation to address ethnic (and
state) claims, but also for peacemaking and intervention to occur. However, while
reciprocal state sovereignty forms the basis of world order,71 ethnic sovereignty may
increasingly become legitimized from the perspective of ethnic actors on normative
and strategic grounds, as ethnic violence against oppressive structures, and vice
versa, continues. This repeats the continuity of one of the classic paradoxes of the
international system that ‘freedom’ can only be won through violence.
Numerous examples illustrate the difficulties the international community has had
in coming to terms with this problem. Perhaps it was this that influenced the UN
Secretary General’s statement that individual sovereignty must become recognized
by the international community.72 However, UN pronouncements on the weakening
of sovereignty are often followed by ringing endorsements,73 graphically illustrating
the trap that neoliberal approaches fall into, when by attempting to ‘enforce’ humani-
tarian norms they come into conflict with the Westphalian foundations of that
system assumed to produce order. This can also be clearly seen in the UN General
Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities.74 Article One states:
1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious,
and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall
encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.
2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those
ends.
Yet Article Eight reaffirms the traditional norms of sovereignty:
4. Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity
contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, including sovereignty
equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.
This resolution was reaffirmed by, among others, the Commission on Human
Rights’ resolution on Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, in which the emphasis was again clearly placed on the role
of states in guaranteeing minority rights.75 The case of the OSCE also illustrates this
unresolved dilemma. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 recognized
human rights and collective rights of peoples for self determination (Principles 7 & 8),
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but principle 6 reaffirms the sanctity of sovereignty. Despite this, the OSCE has
declared that on some occasions that sovereignty may give way to international
intervention when basic human rights have been violated (although this is easily
ignored as the OSCE has no funds, authority or forces). This has been apparent with
the organization’s role in ex-Yugoslavia and the then CSCE’s initiative to inquire into
human rights violations of Albanians in Kosovo.76 More recently, the OSCE peace-
keeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh was unable to deploy because the warring
parties would not give their consent.77 The Lisbon Declaration states that there will
not be support for those who are acting ‘in violation of international law against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any participating State’.78 Further-
more, the interests of the members of international organizations often result in
the exclusion of ethnic conflicts from their agendas, as in the case of Tibet because
of the Chinese veto in the Security Council, Corsica because of the French veto,
and, until recently, East Timor because of Indonesia’s connections with other states.
Normative expectations amongst members of the international community do
seem to be shifting in favour of bypassing sovereignty when international peace and
security are threatened, human rights are violated, and humanitarian disasters are
created by ethnic conflict. The emergence of a contested global civil society
constituted by non-state actors, loosely working to attain human security at the
micro-level but also associating with states, the UN General Assembly, and with
ROs would seem to indicate further developments here. It has been argued that it is
at the level of the global and regional that preventative regimes may be institution-
alized through transnational organizations and NGOs, which are able to contribute
to the pacification of conflicts because the common bond of these organizations is
their mission to enhance co-operation, to facilitate mutual understanding and to
pacify the relations among their members, rather than focusing on the modalities
of sovereign claims and relationships. As Adler has argued, the conditions for a
community to develop are socially constructed—by the individuals, their state, and
by international organizations which can help diffuse and internalize norms and
knowledge about how to peacefully resolve conflicts.79 The creation of supranational
and transnational communities may offset the development of ethnic sovereignty
and the mono-ethnic entities that it threatens to breed, thus preventing the excesses
of both ethnic sovereignty and state sovereignty. Yet, increasingly evidence is emerging
to refute this.80
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Conclusion
All actors at all levels are involved in mediating their interests; sovereignty provides a
flawed framework in which its dynamism as a mediating structure depends on
actors’ access to resources. Yet, sovereignty spans perceived claims that are of
disputed legitimacy to legitimate control of undisputed territories. The legal defini-
tion of sovereignty is therefore a heavily stylized mediating structure derived from
centuries of practice, from the biblical idea of the promised land81 countering Euro-
pean feudalism and leading to the mutual recognition structures required for the
balance of power system to produce an order of sorts. As new actors have emerged
with significant stakes in trans-boundary, trans-state, trans-national, regional and
global interests, and the concurrent legitimization of local cultural, ethnic, and
identity politics, the emerging system of world politics should reflect the new pres-
sures that are arising. Both ethnic groups and states are caught between the sanctity
of state claims to sovereignty and the sanctity of identity. In order to move away
from post-colonial and Westphalian nation states, which tend to fail where multi-
ethnic interest groups conflict, a transnational entity is needed.82 Such entities are
unlikely to emerge if the international community does not come to terms with the
anomalies caused by ethnic identity, ethnic disputants’ lack of representation, and
inherent contradictions in the international system. Unless the distinction between
sovereignty vis-à-vis national groups and identity groups, and its differing ramifica-
tions for security and interdependence, are resolved, ethnic sovereignty, in which
identity groups form visions of their own status, role and rights in the international
system driven by ethnic responses to the perceived structural violence perpetrated by
a system in which identity is overlooked or suppressed, may increase, echoing the
binaries produced by state claims to sovereignty.
Ethnic sovereignty is derived from within ethnic groups themselves, rather than
bestowed from the outside according to mandatory conditions. It is endorsed by
implication by the humanitarian norms to which international society aspires. It is
this to which the international community needs to respond in order to allow the
expression of ethnic sovereignty as a legitimate, rather than a rebel, form of negative
or quasi sovereignty, and one which can coexist with other claims legitimately, rather
than compete illicitly. The days of absolute and exclusive sovereignty are indeed
over, if they ever existed.83 As implied by their name, states are never completed
entities—they are always in the process of becoming and not becoming. Rosenau’s
depiction of the shift from Cold War to post-Cold War eras as ‘bifurcation of world
politics’ between a sovereignty-bound world to a sovereignty-free world84 misses
the point in that a self-constructed ‘web of meaning’, of which perceptions of
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sovereignty are an important part, partially defines actors’ objectives.85 It is this that
claims of sovereignty represent from the point of view of ethnic groups.
Ethnic sovereignty can be defined as a form of status accrued from internal and
sometimes external sources, and derived from reorganization along the lines of a
state project. It arises even as ethnic groups are under pressure from host states, and
even though the international system dictates the inadmissibility of such claims. The
international community, on the other hand, may be less adamantly against con-
ceding legitimacy and sovereignty, though in the majority of cases it now calls for
autonomy and increased safeguards. Subsequently, however, such statements tend to
be exploited by ethnic groups to develop a framework for a case for the legitimacy of
both its objectives and its status, both for the benefit of internal actors and the
international community. Ethnic sovereignty therefore emerges through the logic of
the international system and its replication at a communal level, based on a popular
view of self-determination, the desire for human security, and the ‘guarantees’
engendered in the attainment of sovereignty. It can take the form of actual and de
facto control over territory, the formation of local administrations, or even admini-
strations in exile. For ethnic groups it holds out their only hope that the inter-
national system can provide at least a theoretical framework for their security and
future well-being, is derived therefore from the ethnic groups’ perception of how the
international system operates, and also from the normative and ethical themes that
underpin the problematic but accepted integral principle of self-determination. Yet,
as the case of the collapse of former Yugoslavia aptly illustrated, the recognition of
such claims to sovereignty often result in heightened insecurity. As occurred in East
Timor after the referendum in 1999, even the recognition of the possibility of
separation can lead to violence. Thus, given the emergence of ethnic claims for sover-
eignty it has become important that smaller, homogenous, political units become
viable and integrated parts of an international system that preserves civil values and
identity and avoids the binary replication of the enclosure which the concept of the
nation/national state encourages with respect to identity. When ethnic actors begin to
organize along these lines, they are already becoming dangerously ‘sovereign’ in its
most exclusionary sense.
There is an obvious approach to this problem, which is to reject all absolute
claims to sovereignty.86 To a certain extent this has already occurred in post-colonial
states which had their constitutions created by outside actors, states that are subject
to the demands of international treaties, or rely on peacekeeping, peacemaking or
peacebuilding, or the support of international organizations and institutions. Yet
many such states do not recognize these interpretations of their sovereignty in
practice because of fears of additional territorial claims by other actors.
Given that claims to sovereignty still form the basis for much of world order, the
king’s head remains, if a little shaken by, among other things, the emergence of
ethnic sovereignty. However, sovereign claims produce their own dilemmas both for
ethnic groups and states, and pits them against each other in the context of an
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international system which promotes a myth of absolute state sovereignty as the
guarantee of security, independence and legitimacy, but ultimately selectively provides
neither. This may lead to the creation and recreation of bounded mono-ethnic and
non-pluralist entities, ironically founded on liberal humanitarian norms, reproducing
the sovereign discourse of state-centricity and using parochial identities as the
starting point for a new practice of exclusion.
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